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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

BAA, PLC V. ACACIA MDT. LIFE INS. CO.: MARYLAND
DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A FRAUD EXCEPTION TO THE
STATUTORY ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
PURELY CIVIL ACTIONS.
By: Sarah Jacobs
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a fraud exception to
the accountant-client privilege is not recognized in civil actions. BAA,
PLC v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 400 Md. 136, 929 A.2d 1 (2007).
The Court refused to recognize a judicially-created exception that is
not enumerated in the statute, since the accountant-client privilege is
purely statutory in Maryland. Id. at 158-59,929 A.2d at 14.
In 1997, BAA, PLC ("BAA"), successor of British Airport
Authority, purchased Duty Free International ("Duty Free"), a publicly
traded corporation that sells duty-free goods at airports. In 2000, BAA
decided to sell Duty Free to the Falics, three businessmen. In
preparation for the sale, both parties hired independent auditing firms
to complete a valuation of Duty Free. While evaluating the assets of
Duty Free, Arthur Andersen, LLC ("Arthur Andersen"), hired by the
Falics, contacted Deloitte & Touche LLP ("Deloitte"), hired by BAA,
requesting certain documents from BAA and Duty Free. BAA agreed
to make those documents available provided that the Falics and Arthur
Andersen signed a confidentiality agreement. Both parties agreed and
BAA furnished the information.
In 2001, the Falics and BAA reached an agreement for the sale of
Duty Free, after a significant decrease in the sale price. The Falics
purchased Duty Free, but all of Duty Free's debt obligations remained
its responsibility, including notes assumed by Duty Free prior to its
acquisition by BAA. After the sale in 2002, noteholders of Duty Free
("the Noteholders"), including Acacia Mutual Life Insurance, filed suit
against BAA, Duty Free, and the Falics for breach of fiduciary duty
under the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
("MUFCA"). The Noteholders alleged conspiracy and common law
fraud against BAA.
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Prior to trial, the claims against Duty Free and the Fa1ics were
settled, while the causes of action against BAA were limited to breach
of fiduciary duty and violations of MUFCA. The Noteholders alleged
that the reduced sale price left Duty Free insolvent. During discovery,
the Noteholders sought to discover documents from De1oitte's audit of
Duty Free. Deloitte produced a number of documents, but invoked the
accountant-client privilege provided by section 9-110 of the Courts
and Judicial Proceeding Article ("section 9-110") for others.
The Noteholders filed a motion to compel disclosure in the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County, arguing that there exists an
applicable fraud exception to the accountant-client privilege. The
circuit court denied the motion. At the close of the trial, the
Noteholders requested that the jury be instructed that goodwill should
be considered an intangible asset with no liquidity value when
assessing insolvency. The circuit court instructed the jury as to the
assessment of insolvency, but refused to instruct about goodwill.
The Noteholders appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland on three separate issues. In an unreported opinion, the
Court of Special Appeals, applying the law of Dixon v. Bennett,
remanded the case to the trial court, holding that there is a fraud
exception to the accountant-client privilege. BAA, 400 Md. at 147,
929 A.2d at 7 (citing Dixon v. Bennett, 72 Md. App. 620, 531 A.2d
1318 (1987)).
BAA petitioned for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland to determine the following issues: first, whether Maryland
recognizes a fraud exception in civil actions; second, whether the
exception can be satisfied by allegations rather than evidence; and,
third, whether goodwill is considered an intangible asset under
Maryland Code section 15-202(a). BAA, 400 Md. at 149, 929 A.2d at
8. Similarly, the Noteholders filed a cross-petition. Id. at 149, 929
A.2d at 8. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari for
both BAA's petition and the Noteholders' cross petition. Id. at 149,
929 A.2d at 8.
The Court began with an examination of the plain language of
section 9-11O(d). BAA, 400 Md. at 150-51, 929 A.2d at 9-10.
Because the accountant-client privilege is created by statute, the Court
held that exceptions are limited to those enumerated in section 9110(d). BAA, 400 Md. at 150, 929 A.2d at 9. Those exceptions
include actions governed by the criminal or bankruptcy laws or
proceedings by the State Board of Public Accountancy. Id. at 150,
929 A.2d at 9.
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland then addressed the degree to
which judges may interpret common law and statutory privileges. Id.
at 158, 929 A.2d at 14. The substantive law relating to common law
privileges (such as the attorney-client privilege), which are merely
codified, is a matter for the courts to determine. Id. at 158, 929 A.2d
at 14. In contrast, the Court refused to review the legislative intent
behind section 9-11 O( d) to infer any unenumerated exceptions. Id. at
159, 929 A.2d at 14. The Court held that where the Legislature
expressly enumerated exceptions, the Court will not read in additional
exceptions. Id. at 152,929 A.2d at 10.
For all of the above reasons, the Court overruled the portion of
Dixon relating to the accountant-client privilege. Accordingly, the
Court found that the privilege had no applicable fraud exception under
the circumstances in the instant case. Id. at 159,929 A.2d at 15.
The Court, relying on precedent, held that unless the allegation is
for criminal fraud, the "exception to the accountant-client privilege is
inapplicable .... " Id. at 155, 929 A.2d at 12. The Court determined
that the instant case did not fall within one of the exceptions because it
was a civil action governed by MUFCA. BAA, 400 Md. at 151, 159,
929 A.2d at 9, 15.
The Court rejected the Noteholders' argument that BAA waived the
privilege by providing the confidential materials to the Falics and
Arthur Andersen, finding that the Falics and Arthur Andersen were not
third parties and that BAA only released the information under a
confidentiality agreement. Id. at 163, 929 A.2d at 16-17. The Court
also held that BAA did not waive the privilege in referring to the
documents at trial because "a party does not waive the accountantclient privilege by denying the opposing accusations ...." Id. at 161,
929 A.2d at 16 (citation omitted).
Additionally, the Court upheld the circuit court's jury instruction on
the issue of goodwill as an asset for determining insolvency. Id. at
164, 929 A.2d at 17-18. The Court found nothing in MUFCA that
excludes goodwill as an asset for the calculation. BAA, 400 Md. at
166, 929 A.2d at 18-19. While it is not an independently liquid asset,
goodwill falls within the statutory definition of "asset," and therefore
can appropriately be used in the jury's determination of insolvency.
Id. at 166,929 A.2d at 18-19.
The Court's decision demonstrates the significance given to
privileges, and specifically the Court's reluctance to circumvent the
Legislature's language regarding privileges. The Court plainly stated
the difference between common law and statutory privileges. As a
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result, it is a signal to practitioners that, when preparing for discovery,
one should consider the origin of privileges and take heed of any
express exceptions prior to issuing subpoenas.

